In light of these concerns and others, most recent philosopherssympathetic with the view described in the first paragraph of thissection have abandoned traditional dispositionalism. They divide intoroughly two classes, which we may call liberaldispositionalists and interpretationists. Liberaldispositionalists avoid the first objection by abandoning thereductionist project associated with traditionaldispositionalism. They permit appeal to other mental states inspecifying the dispositions relevant to any particularbelief—including other beliefs and desires. They also broadenthe range of dispositions considered relevant to the possession of abelief so as to include at least some dispositions to undergo privatemental episodes that do not manifest in outwardly observablebehavior—dispositions, for example, for the subject to feel (andnot just exhibit) surprise should she discover the falsity ofP, for her privately to draw conclusions from P, tofeel confidence in the truth of P, to utter Psilently to herself in inner speech, and so forth. This appears alsoto mitigate the second objection to some extent: The Muscovitepossesses his belief about Stalin's purges at least as much in virtueof the things he says silently to himself and the disapproval heprivately feels as in virtue of his disposition to express thatopinion were the political climate to change. Advocates of views ofthis sort include Price (1969), Audi (1972), Baker (1995),Schwitzgebel (2002, 2013), and arguably Ryle (1949) (though Bakercharacterizes her view in terms of conditional statements rather thandispositions).


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