Aquinas was a Dominican friar. The other major order of friars, theFranciscan, had its own school of philosophy, starting withBonaventure (c. 1217–74), who held that while we can learn fromboth Plato and Aristotle, and both are also in error, the greatererror is Aristotle's. One other major figure from this tradition isJohn Duns Scotus (literally John from Duns, the Scot,c. 1266–1308), and there are three significant differencesbetween him and Aquinas on the relation between morality andreligion. First, Scotus is not a eudaimonist. He takes a doubleaccount of motivation from Anselm (1033–1109), who made thedistinction between two affections of the will, the affection foradvantage (an inclination towards one's own happiness and perfection)and the affection for justice (an inclination towards what is good initself independent of advantage) (Anselm, De Concordia 3.11,281:7–10; De Casu Diaboli 12, 255:8–11). Originalsin is a ranking of advantage over justice, which needs to be reversedby God's assistance before we can be pleasing to God. Scotus says thatwe should be willing to sacrifice our own happiness for God if Godwere to require this. Second, he does not think that the moral law isself-evident or necessary. He takes the first table to be necessary,since it derives (except for the ‘every seventh day’provision of the command about the Sabbath) from the necessaryprinciple that God is to be loved. But the second table is contingent,though fitting our nature, and God could prescribe different commandseven for human beings (Ord. I, dist. 44). One of his examplesis the proscription on theft, which applies only to beings withproperty, and so not necessarily to human beings (since they are notnecessarily propertied). God also gives dispensation from thecommands, according to Scotus, for example the command to Abraham tokill Isaac (Ord III, suppl. Dist. 37). Third, Scotus deniedthe application of teleology to non-intentional nature, and thusdeparted from the Aristotelian and Thomist view. This does not meanthat we have no natural end ortelos, but that this end is related to the intention of Godin the same way a human artisan intends his or her products to have acertain purpose (see Hare 2006, chapter 2).


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