The appeal to human cognitive limitations does raise a very importantissue, and we have seen that one very natural account of the logicalform of the inductive step in the case of a direct inductive argumentis not satisfactory. But, as we have seen in sections 3.3 and 3.4,there are other accounts of the type of reasoning involved in thecrucial inductive step in evidential forms of the argument fromevil. First of all, the appeal to human cognitive limitations doesnot itself show that there is anything wrong either with thereasoning that Draper offers in support of the crucial premise in hisindirect inductive version of the argument from evil, or with theinference to the best explanation type of reasoning employed in theupdated version of Hume’s indirect inductive formulation of theargument from evil. Secondly, the appeal to human cognitivelimitations provides no reason at all for rejecting the version ofthe argument from evil that appeals to fundamental equiprobabilityprinciples of inductive logic, principles that arguably must obtainif any sort of induction is ever justified.


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